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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This case study highlights the need for appropriate interpretation and enforcement 
of FATF recommendations in developing and middle income countries using the 
example of South Africa.  The study shows that there is a clear potential 
contradiction between inappropriate and strict rules-based enforcement of FATF 
recommendations, and access to financial services for the majority of a developing 
country’s population. 
South Africa implemented the FATF AML standards in June 2003 when the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) came into force.  In line with international 
practice on customer identification and verification FICA requires financial 
institutions to obtain and verify the residential address of a client before they enter 
into a business relationship with the client or process a transaction for the client. 
To date financial institutions could not comply fully with this requirement.  The 
reason is that one third of the population live in informal dwellings without formal 
address whilst up to half of the population lack the documents to verify their 
residential addresses.  These are primarily low income persons.  The Banking 
Council responded by issuing a Practice Note suggesting that banks dispense with 
the verification requirement when the client cannot prove his or her address.  The 
banks face a similar difficulty with the requirement to re-identify existing clients. 
South Africa has not yet implemented the FATF Recommendations on Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism.  Despite the presence of a large immigrant community, 
originating primarily from countries in the Southern African region, the levels of 
formal remittances are very low.  Early evidence therefore suggests the presence 
of an extensive informal remittances sector, most of it in the form of cash 
remittances using cross-border transport.  This corresponds with the large informal 
cash-based economy in which most poor South Africans and immigrants operate. 
The case of South Africa offers the following positive recommendations for 
reducing the contradiction between the need to include the poor in the formal 
financial sector and – at the same time – more effective FATF outcomes: 
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 The implementation of FATF AML Recommendations should be sensitive to 
the particular circumstances of developing and middle income countries.  A 
cost-benefit analysis should be done before legislation is passed.  Clarity must 
be obtained regarding the measure of latitude that countries have to formulate 
context-sensitive regulations to meet the FATF Recommendations; 
 AML and CFT risks are very different things and have different faces in 
different societies.  An internationally acceptable yardstick to determine AML 
and CFT risks should be designed to enable developing countries to follow a 
risk-based approach in respect those who are financially and socially 
vulnerable; 
 The imposition of regulation by itself will not force the users of informal 
financial services to suddenly use formal services.  It may have the opposite 
effect.  The provision of low-cost, user-friendly products that require minimal 
administration will achieve more; and 
 International AML practice on client identification and verification should not 
follow a universal template.  Developing and middle income countries may 
have national identification systems that will be equally effective to identify 
clients. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on anti-money laundering 
(AML)and combating financing of terrorism (CFT) are increasingly being applied within 
middle income and developing countries.  Early experience suggests that the manner in 
which they are being implemented may put at risk the goal of increased inclusion of the 
low income earners into the financial sector. The success of the related drive to 
formalise remittance flows, and whether this process promotes or reduces financial 
inclusion, will be determined in part on how appropriately the FATF recommendations 
are applied to developing country and informal sector realities. South Africa has been 
actively implementing FATF recommendations for long enough to offer valuable insights 
and lessons in the context of financial inclusion and access to financial services.  
The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has requested the FinMark 
Trust, which is based in Johannesburg, South Africa and funded by DFID, to prepare a 
short case study on the impact, actual and potential, of FAFT AML and CFT standards 
on access to financial services in South Africa. This report will also feed into the policy 
process in the UK, which is currently preparing its submission on remittances to the G7, 
and which actively supports the implementations of the FATF recommendations as well 
as financial access programmes worldwide. 
FinMark’s mission is to make financial markets work for the poor and it has worked 
extensively on regulatory obstacles to the extension of financial services to low income 
individuals in South Africa.  Although much of this work focused on transaction banking 
services, many of the same issues apply to remittances.  And indeed little research and 
analysis have been done on the impact of the implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations on development.  The South African experience on the transaction 
banking side coupled with fairly realistic projections of the likely impact on remittances 
provides useful evidence to inform FATF implementation in developing countries. 
 
                                                     
1 The authors acknowledge with appreciation the comments from the South African National Treasury on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
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2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
AML and CFT regulation is no different from other regulation applicable to the financial 
sector.  It imposes either absolute barriers or costs on the usage of the financial services 
concerned.  The costs are two-fold – compliance costs for the financial institutions and 
direct costs for the client.  Jointly they increase the transaction costs for the client of 
using a service.   
Absolute barriers prevent persons from using a service.  For example, if the regulation 
requires certain formal documents to be presented, persons without the documents are 
effectively excluded from the service.  Transaction costs, when unaffordable, can also 
prevent persons from using a service.  If the transaction costs imposed on utilising 
formal sector services are too high, clients are likely to abandon the formal sector and 
turn to informal sector provision (the informal sector is by definition beyond the reach of 
regulation and the incremental transaction costs imposed by it).  This defeats the very 
object of imposing the regulation in the first instance, and has negative consequences 
for the development of the society. 
Within this framework, what is the likely impact of the implementation of AML and CFT 
standards in developing countries?  We look at this question drawing on recent 
experience with AML implementation in South Africa. 
3. SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Broad-based black economic empowerment (BEE) is a key policy objective of South 
Africa’s government.  The purpose of BEE is to correct the racially skewed economic 
development of the country caused by apartheid.  An essential plank of this is the 
government’s objective to extend access to basic financial services to low income 
households.  The scale of this task is daunting, since recent research2 shows that 50% 
of the 27 million adult South Africans do not have bank accounts. 
To meet this challenge, the South African financial sector has negotiated a Financial 
Sector BEE Charter, endorsed by the government, in which financial institutions commit 
themselves to the achievement, over a period of 5 years, of specific targets for the 
                                                     
2  FinScope 2003, a FinMark Trust initiative, http://www.finscope.co.za 
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extension of access to financial services to low income households (defined as 
households earning less than approximately US$340 per month).  One of the Charter 
targets is that 80% of these low income households should have access to transaction 
banking services by 2008.  A financial institution’s failure to meet its Charter and other 
BEE commitments will affect its ability to secure government contracts. 
To give effect to this obligation under the Charter, banks have formed a joint initiative to 
develop a branded National Bank Account that would provide low-income individuals 
with low-cost basic savings and transactions services. 
The South African government also seeks to integrate South Africa into the international 
community following the isolation of the apartheid years.  This includes integrating the 
country into international capital and financial markets, as well as compliance with 
international standards including financial regulation and safety measures.  As part of 
this policy the government has committed itself to combating money laundering and the 
funding of terrorism. Following implementation of its AML system, South Africa was 
admitted as a member of the FATF in June 2003. 
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4. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The international AML and CFT standards are embodied in the Forty plus Eight 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”).3 
The Forty Recommendations were first formulated in 1990 to address the laundering of 
proceeds of crime, in particular the proceeds of drug trafficking. In October 2001, 
following the terror attacks of 9/11, a strategic decision was taken by the FATF to 
broaden its scope and that of the money laundering control framework to combat the 
funding of terrorism. Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing were 
therefore adopted to supplement the Forty Recommendations. The Forty 
Recommendations were substantially revised in 2003. In their current form they provide 
detailed standards that countries and financial institutions must meet to combat money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. 
Non-compliance with the Recommendations can impact negatively on the economy of a 
country. Financial institutions are required to give special attention to transactions and 
clients that are linked to non-compliant countries. These due diligence procedures slow 
down and, in certain cases, hamper the relevant transactions and clients. Non-compliant 
countries may also be subjected to appropriate countermeasures by other countries. 
4.1. CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 
The 2003 Forty Recommendations require financial institutions to identify their 
customers and to verify a customer’s identity using reliable, independent source 
documents, data or information. These procedures form part of general customer due 
diligence (“CDD”) procedures. 
Whilst the current FATF CDD requirements are more detailed and strict than the pre-
2003 requirements, they also allow countries to follow a risk-based approach in respect 
of CDD. It works like this.  The general rule is that customers must be subject to the full 
                                                     
3 The pre-2003 Recommendations were endorsed by more than 130 countries. These standards were also 
recognized by the World Bank and the IMF as the international standards for combating money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism. The Recommendations are reinforced by international instruments such as the 2000 United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 2003 United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. 
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range of CDD measures. Nevertheless it is recognised that there are circumstances 
where (i) the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is lower, (ii) information on 
the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner of a customer is publicly available, 
or (iii) where adequate checks and controls exist elsewhere in national systems. In such 
circumstances a country may allow its financial institutions to apply simplified or reduced 
CDD measures with respect to identification and verification.  For higher risk categories 
of customers or transactions, on the other hand, financial institutions are expected to 
perform enhanced due diligence.  
The Recommendations must be read in conjunction with other relevant international 
standards.  Two publications of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision4 provide 
an important CDD benchmark for banks.  The 2003 publication (the “Basel Guide”) 
requires specific information to be obtained from clients and for it to be verified as set out 
in the Guide (see Appendix A). The guidelines are strict, but also allow a risk-based 
approach. 
4.2. RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS REQUIREMENTS 
The 2003 FATF Recommendations do not explicitly require information to be gathered 
about a client’s residential address and for this information to be verified. The 
Recommendations simply require as a general principle that a client’s identity should be 
established and verified using independent, reliable source documents, data or 
information (referred to as ”identification data”).  However, international best practice is 
that the client’s residential address should be obtained and preferably verified.5 Certain 
advanced jurisdictions such as the UK and the USA require residential addresses to be 
obtained and verified but allow institutions to accept non-standard verification 
                                                     
4 The 2001 paper entitled “Customer due diligence for banks” as supplemented by the 2003 annexure entitled 
“General guide to account opening and customer identification”.  The Interpretative Notes to the 2003 FATF 
Recommendations incorporate certain portions of the guide by reference. 
5 See, for instance, Commonwealth Secretariat A model of best practice for combating money laundering in the 
financial sector (2000) 69-70: “An individual’s identity comprises her/his name and all other names used, the 
address at which s/he can be located, date of birth and nationality.” See also the reference to address in Special 
Recommendation VII as an element of “accurate and meaningful originator information” (a requirement 
subsequently softened by the relevant interpretative note). Note the relevance of the correct permanent address in 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s “General guide to account opening and customer identification” 
(see Appendix A), the UK approach to the verification of clients’ addresses (especially the guidance issued by the 
UK Joint Money Laundering Steering Group) and the US residential address verification requirements in the final 
regulation under section 326 of the USA Patriot Act 2001 (Customer Identification Program for Banks, Savings 
Associations, Credit Unions and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks). 
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documentation (for instance, a letter of a person in a position of responsibility or 
information relating to the address of next of kin) when persons are reasonably believed 
to be incapable of producing standard documentation or where they do not have a 
residential address.  We now turn to how this key issue is dealt with in one FATF-
compliant developing country, South Africa. 
5. FATF IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
5.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW 
South Africa first criminalised drug-related money laundering in 1992 and in 1996 
broadened the scope of its money laundering laws to the proceeds of all types of crime. 
The current money laundering offences are mainly created by the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act of 1998 and the money laundering control provisions are mainly 
set out in the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 (“FICA”).  The latter should be 
read in conjunction with its attendant regulations and exemptions.  Funding of terrorism 
has not yet been criminalised but relevant legislation is in the final stages of adoption 
pending completion of the April 2004 general election. 
5.2. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 
FICA requires all businesses, all persons in charge of businesses and any employee of 
a business to report suspicious and unusual transactions to the Financial Intelligence 
Centre (“FIC”). The FIC is South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Unit. It receives the FICA 
reports and shares the intelligence with law enforcement units.  
FICA also creates a range of money laundering control obligations for “accountable 
institutions”. These institutions include banks, insurance companies, money remitters, 
casinos, attorneys and bureau de change. They are required to identify and verify the 
identities of their customers, keep the relevant records, report specified transactions to 
the FIC and generally to have the necessary compliance procedures in place. The 
control obligations are detailed in the regulations under FICA (the Money Laundering 
Control Regulations) and are tempered by a set of Exemptions issued by the Minister of 
Finance.  The supervisory powers in relation to money laundering control are entrusted 
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to the existing regulatory authorities. The main financial supervisory bodies for purpose 
of FICA are the South African Reserve Bank, which supervises compliance by banks, 
and the Financial Services Board, which performs the same functions in relation to non-
bank financial institutions. 
5.3. CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 
FICA’s control framework follows international best practice, particularly in relation to 
identification and verification.  Detailed information about these requirements is set out in 
Appendix B.  In respect of natural persons, financial institutions are required to obtain 
the client’s full names, date of birth, identity number and residential address.  Provision 
is also made for the income tax number (if issued) to be obtained, but this requirement is 
not currently in force.  
The regulations require that names, dates of birth and identity numbers be verified by 
comparing it the person’s official South African identity document or another equivalent 
and acceptable document.  Where necessary these particulars must also be compared 
with information obtained from any other independent source. The residential address 
must be compared to information that can reasonably be expected to achieve verification 
of the particulars and can be obtained by reasonably practical means. 
Identification and verification procedures must be followed before a single once-off 
transaction is concluded or any transaction is carried out in the course of a business 
relationship. These procedures must therefore also be followed in respect of money 
remittance through an accountable institution. Accountable institutions were given a year 
(ending on 30 June 2004) to implement the same identification and verification 
procedures in respect of all their existing clients. 
To an extent, exemptions temper the strict regime.  The exemptions relate mainly to 
smaller transactions and low-risk customers.  Provision was also made for smaller 
clients (defined as clients whose bank balance does not exceed US$3800, whose rights 
to deposit and withdraw funds are limited to specified amounts and who are not entitled 
to transfer funds out of their accounts internationally.) In practice, though, this exemption 
has proved to be of little value, since a number of the conditions imposed by the 
exemption either run counter to needs of the low income market, or conflict with the 
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optimal product design of low cost products.6  For example, most mass market products 
utilise internationally branded debit cards with cross-border functionality.  The exemption 
prohibits this.  The exemption also requires a 180 day dormancy cut-off – an unrealistic 
requirement for seasonal and other workers without a regular income.  In any event, the 
whole scheme of exemptions has now come under fire. In its June 2003 evaluation, 
FATF criticised South Africa for its “large number of exemptions from the customer 
identification and record-keeping requirement, some of which seem to unduly limit the 
effectiveness of the law.” FATF therefore advised that these exemptions should be 
amended or their number lessened. In response, government officials apparently 
undertook not to increase the reach of the current exemptions. 
6. IMPACT ON ACCESS TO FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
The implementation of the FATF AML standards in South Africa has placed the domestic 
financial sector under great pressure.  FICA came into force on 30 June 2003.  All the 
major financial institutions undertook extensive projects to prepare for implementation.  
These included the creation of FICA compliance functions, training of staff (an estimated 
80 000 staff members underwent an initial standardised 8 hour AML training programme 
in 2003 with more to undergo training in 2004) and the design and modification of 
systems.  
                                                     
6 See Genesis Analytics, 2003, Legislative and regulatory obstacles to mass banking parr 6.6 and 9.1.  
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6.1. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO RESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES 
Once it came to implementing the CDD requirements of FICA, financial institutions ran 
into insurmountable problems.  The most important of these relate to the fact that at 
least one-third of South African households do not have formal addresses: according to 
the most recent census (2001) 30% of the approximately 9.1 million households in South 
Africa live in either traditional dwellings or informal structures. The statistics from the 
South African Post Office (“SAPO”) are also telling. The SAPO maintain a database of 
formal addresses in the country.  They have just more than 4 million addresses, these 
include business addresses, on their database, compared to 9.1 million households. 
When financial institutions requested existing and prospective clients to produce 
documentary proof of residential address, which is normally taken to be utility bills or 
other accounts containing both the name and physical address of the individual, most 
low income clients could not deliver such proof.  
6.2. THE BANKS’ RESPONSE 
To deal with this challenge, the Banking Council issued a Practice Note to its members 
giving guidelines on the implementation of FICA. Regarding residential address 
verification for clients in the so-called mass market (which they define as account 
holders with a net monthly income into the account of less than US$770) the Practice 
Note requires banks to request proof of residential address. However, if the client 
responds that he or she does not have any “and the bank is reasonably satisfied with 
that answer, i.e. the physical address details are consistent with such and answer, the 
answer should be noted and the account opened or transaction concluded”. This is the 
approach currently followed by all banks.   
FICA requires banks to obtain proof of address before an account is opened or a 
transaction concluded. The current banking practice is to attempt to comply with this 
legislative requirement, but to not do so if the bank reasonably believes that it is 
impractical to comply with the law. The banks’ approach received the backing of the 
South African Registrar of Banks when, with reference to this particular aspect, he was 
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reported as acknowledging that banks were not fully complying with FICA, saying that 
the Act was proving impossible to implement.7 
In essence, banks are required to give effect to two conflicting government policies: 
 facilitating access to banking by those who are financially and socially vulnerable;  
and 
 implementing strict money laundering controls.  
Banks opted to comply with their obligations in terms of the Financial Charter and to give 
precedence to the first policy. However, they have not totally abandoned attempts to 
comply with the second policy objective.  
Both government and the banking industry are working hard to resolve this issue. The 
matter is urgent as financial institutions are required by FICA to have re-identified and 
verified all their existing clients before 30 June 2004.8 No transactions may be performed 
after that date in respect of clients who have not been identified and verified in 
accordance with FICA. This looming deadline for the re-identification of existing clients 
has intensified the concerns of the banks who are obviously not keen to lose millions of 
their current clients due to the clients’ inability to produce formal proof of residential 
address. The extent of the problem faced by banks is evident from the fact that seven 
million of the 18.5 million bank accounts in South Africa fall within the mass market 
affected here. To date the government has not changed the relevant regulation, neither 
has guidance notes been issued on this matter. The acting director of the FIC has also 
been reported as saying that no exemption to the laws was likely.9 
A companion problem for financial institutions relate to the requirement to maintain up-
to-date records of residential address. South Africa, in common with many developing 
countries with relatively low levels of urbanisation, has a very mobile population.  A 
recent (2003) study on internal migration showed that between 1992 and 1996, 38 
                                                     
7 Rose, R., 2003 (12 December), Money laundering laws ‘impossible’, Business Day. 
8 See, in general, Du Preez, L.,2004 (3 April),  Identify yourself or your money may be frozen, Personal Finance; 
Naidu, E., 2004 (4 April) Banks rush to avoid ID chaos The Sunday Independent; Khangale, N., 2004 (6 April), 
Bank law could see customers lose their accounts The Star. 
9 Rose, R., 2003 (12 December), Money laundering laws ‘impossible’, Business Day. 
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percent of South Africans moved house at least once10.  These high levels of internal 
migration have had a fascinating impact on the domestic telecoms industry.  This is 
illustrated by the fact that, although mobile telephony was introduced in South Africa as 
recent as 1997, mobile telephones now exceed landlines by a factor of more than 3 to 1 
(13.8 million versus 4.2 million). People living in the burgeoning urban and peri-urban 
townships have little use for landlines if they are constantly on the move.  Under such 
circumstances maintaining up to date residential addresses for clients in this section of 
the population has very little meaning, whilst imposing significant costs on financial 
institutions. 
6.3. COMPLIANCE COSTS 
Regulatory compliance imposes costs, both for financial institutions and clients.  FATF 
rules are no exception.  One major South African bank estimated the initial cost of AML 
compliance at US$18.5 million with a recurring cost of at least US$1 million per annum. 
Financial institutions absorb some of these costs, but inevitably some costs are passed 
on to the users of the services. In addition clients themselves bear direct compliance 
costs in terms of time spent, document acquiring and understanding a set of complex 
rules. Low income clients are far more vulnerable to such costs than higher income 
clients.  According to a recent FinMark survey, the main reason that a large segment of 
the mass-market is unbanked is that they cannot afford banking services12.   
 
7. IMPACT ON REMITTANCES 
South Africa’s AML legislation, FICA, covers money remittances through formal financial 
institutions, including dedicated money remitters.  As indicated, South Africa has 
undertaken to implement the CFT standards, but has yet to give full effect to that 
undertaking.   
                                                     
10 Source:  Kok, Pieter, O’Donovan, Michael, Bouare, Oumar & Van Zyl, Johan, 2003, Post-Apartheid Patterns of 
Internal Migration in South Africa, Cape Town: HSRC Publishers  (Full details, initials etc) 
12  The FinScope survey shows that the main reason given by the unbanked for why people don’t have bank accounts 
is that “people do not have enough money”. 27% of unbanked respondents, the highest proportion, gave this reply. 
A further 24% replied that “people are not regularly employed”. When asked what the greatest problems with 
banks are, 19% of unbanked respondents, the highest proportion, replied that bank charges are too high. 
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The actual profile of money remittances in South Africa is heavily under-researched.  
What is clear though, is that a vibrant informal money remittance system exists side-by-
side with the formal money remittance system.  In relation to cross-border remittances 
this is apparent from comparing the number of formal sector remittance transactions with 
the number of foreign migrants present in the country.   
A study conducted in 200313 compared the costs of transferring US$40 cross-border 
within the Southern African region, utilising different remittance systems.  The results 
showed a clear distinction between formal and informal systems.  It found that whereas 
the cost of utilising an informal cash courier system amounted to between 10 and 20 % 
of the amount transferred, utilising banks and formal transfer agents such as 
MoneyGram cost between 50 and 64% of the amount transferred (the percentage is 
reduced for larger transfer amounts).  The cheapest formal sector option was the SAPO 
which charged about 19% of the amount for a telegraphic money order.  However, in 
2003 the SAPO intermediated only 46 000 overseas remittances with an average value 
of US$82. 
How does this compare with the number of foreign migrants in South Africa?  Formal 
statistics14 suggest that South Africa had 942 000 foreign immigrants in 2001.  However, 
this is unlikely to include illegal immigrants working in the country. In 1996, between 2.5 
and 4.1 million illegal immigrants were estimated to be in South Africa15, and it is unlikely 
that the number would have reduced since then. 
Therefore the bulk of remittances from South Africa to neighbouring countries flows via 
the informal rather than the formal remittance system. One reason is that illegal 
immigrants find it difficult to access formal remittance systems, unless they can do it 
through a third party with the necessary documentation. Although particular South 
African cultural communities familiar with such systems do use hawala-type remittance 
processes, this is suspected to be very limited.  The majority of informal remittances flow 
via cash couriers who move cross-border.  These are either friends or family going 
“home”, or taxi-drivers in South Africa’s vibrant minibus taxi industry.  Anecdotal 
                                                     
13 Genesis Analytics, 2003, African families, African money: The money transfer system in South Africa, prepared for 
the FinMark Trust, www.finmark.org.za  
14 Statistics South Africa, Census 2001, http://www.statssa.gov.za. 
15 Estimated by the Human Sciences Research Council from a study completed in 1996. It is important to note that it 
is difficult to estimate these numbers accurately. The HSRC has since retracted this estimate. It is still quoted by 
the SA Dept. of Home Affairs (http://home-affairs.pwv.gov.za/faq.asp). 
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evidence suggests that informal remittances are generally very cheap and simple to 
achieve16, and have a number of other advantages17, even though they are generally 
more risky. This greater use of informal rather than formal money remittance 
mechanisms is in line with trends elsewhere in the world.  It is estimated that, globally, 
informal remittances are 1.5 times the value of formal remittances.18  However, it is also 
a result of the exchange control regime applicable in South Africa.  Exchange control 
regulations cause formal international money transfers19 to be far more costly and more 
complex to achieve than informal remittances. 
The use of informal as opposed to formal means of remitting money is also consistent 
with the number of people in South Africa who depend on the informal sector for their 
income.  According to the 2003 Labour Force Survey, 42 percent of the South African 
labour force is currently unemployed, and a further 9.5 percent are employed in the 
informal sector.  This is reflected in the fact that 54 percent of South Africans receive 
their income in cash20. The majority of South Africans therefore live and conduct their 
financial transactions in an informal cash-based society. To the extent that these 
transactions do not pass through the formal financial sector, they are beyond the reach 
of FICA and other regulations for implementing FATF standards in South Africa.  On the 
remittances side it would be practically impossible to register the persons and institutions 
undertaking informal remittance services, simply because of the dispersed and 
fragmented nature of the process and the limited capacity of regulators. 
Implementation of CFT / AML standards in the money transfer environment in a 
manner that does not take into account the need for simplicity and low-cost 
                                                     
16 Source: Genesis Analytics, 2003, African families, African money: The money transfer system in South Africa, 
prepared for the FinMark Trust, www.finmark.org.za 
17 Other benefits of transmitting money informally include: cheap service for transfer of small amounts, relative to the 
banking industry that charges high minimum fees; no monthly charges; based on familiar communal networks 
(cultural inertia); avoidance of currency controls; avoidance of distorted exchange valuations (in the case of 
Zimbabwe, for instance); avoidance of government taxes; avoidance of uncertain receiving end charges; non-
reliance on formal infrastructure; non-reliance on documentation (no literacy constraints) ; and transfers from illegal 
persons can be facilitated. 
18 Source: Sander, Cerstin, 2003, Capturing a market share? Migrant remittance transfers & commercialization of 
microfinance in Africa, Paper prepared for the conference on Current Issues in Microfinance, Johannesburg 12-14 
August 2003 
19 All South African citizens and residents (temporary and permanent) can send up to US$4600 per annum abroad as 
a “gift”. They may remit these funds only through “Authorised Dealers”, and must complete a number of documents 
and fulfil several requirements in order to achieve this. 
20 Source: FinScope, 2003, published by the FinMark Trust, www.finmark.org.za. 
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products, and the number of residents who conduct their affairs entirely within the 
informal cash-based economy, risks having little effect. 
 
8. OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
8.1. CONTEXT-SENSITIVE REGULATION  
AML legislation presupposes the existence of formal systems and documents that 
financial institutions can use to verify client details. The international AML standards 
were clearly formulated with developed countries in mind.  However, developing 
countries often lack the systems and the documentation required.  Developing countries 
forced to adopt legislation based on first world models are put in an invidious position: 
their financial institutions may contravene the law (often with tacit approval of regulators 
and law enforcers); or they comply, with severe consequences in respect of financial 
exclusion of particularly the poor.  
In South Africa this is exactly what happened following the AML requirement to provide a 
residential address and documentary proof to verify the address.  On the one hand, 
financial institutions wish to comply with the law. On the other hand, strict compliance 
with the requirements would exclude millions of South Africans from financial services 
and undermine their social commitments, for example as agreed to in the Financial 
Sector Charter.  Simply put the requirement to record and verify a client’s residential 
address does not match well with the fact that a third of the population do not have 
formal residential addresses, and that close to half of the population do not have the 
means to verify whatever address they may have cited.  At the same time, the value of 
recording a residential address is limited in a society with high levels of internal 
migration.   
A full cost/benefit analysis of this requirement may have assisted South Africa to 
formulate context-sensitive regulations that would still meet the objectives of the 
international AML standards.  It would also have been helpful to have clarity about the 
degree of latitude that a country has to formulate context-sensitive regulations within the 
broader international AML framework. South Africa drafted its laws to meet the 1996 
FATF Recommendations.  In this process it made assumptions about the strictness of 
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the standards and international expectations.  However, the lack of clarity resulted in 
some of the rules exceeding the international standards while others were criticized as 
falling short. The 2003 Recommendations are more detailed, but still do not provide 
developing and middle-income countries with sufficient guidance to confidently follow a 
context-sensitive approach when implementing the Recommendations. 
8.2. YARDSTICK TO DETERMINE RISK  
The 2003 FATF Recommendations introduced the principle of a risk-based approach, 
but have not provided sufficient guidance on how to apply this approach.  Admittedly, the 
interpretative notes to the Recommendations provide some examples of lower risk 
clients and transactions, but they do not allow developing countries to confidently 
classify transactions and accounts of the financially and socially vulnerable as low risk.  
These uncertainties are mainly caused by the lack of a proper yardstick with which to 
measure risk.  Prior to 2001, risk in terms of AML was often determined by using 
monetary value.  Indeed, elements of this approach are still evident in the current 
Recommendations.  However, given the fairly small amounts required to fund terrorism, 
monetary value is not necessarily an adequate gauge with which to measure the funding 
of terrorism risk. 
AML and CFT risks are very different things and have different faces in different 
communities and geographies.  For example, the CFT risks associated with intra-
regional cross-border transfers between developing countries are in all likelihood 
different from the CFT risks involved in cross-border transfers between developing 
countries on the one hand, and developed countries subject to terrorism risk, on the 
other.  The question arises whether it is wise to enforce the same standards in respect of 
transfers in both cases. 
More generally, a risk-based approach to either supervision or compliance requires a 
keen understanding of the risks involved.  Currently, very little information is available on 
especially funding of terrorism risks and its indicators in developing countries.  The 
uncertainties around risk are potentially costly to developing countries.  An incorrect or 
even disputed classification of clients or transactions as low risk, may expose a country 
to international censure. Given the lack of certainty, developing countries may therefore 
err on the side of caution, choosing to classify even the most innocuous financially 
excluded and their transactions as high risk. 
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8.3. FORMALISING THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
In South Africa about half of the population conduct their financial transactions beyond 
the reach of the formal financial sector and thus substantially beyond the reach of AML 
and CFT regulation.  It is in the interest of economic development and AML/CFT 
enforcement that these transactions should be drawn into the formal sector.   
A standard approach to do so, and one evident in the FATF Recommendations, is to 
formulate regulations to formalise the informal sector.  However, if the enforcement of 
regulation of the informal sector could be achieved with ease, surely governments would 
have done so a long time ago.  International regulators and governments should 
therefore be more sensitive to the actual reach of their powers into the informal sector.  
Just as South African exchange control regulations have contributed to much of the 
cross-border remittances of low income migrants being out of the formal sector, the strict 
and inappropriate enforcement of AML/CFT regulations could achieve the same. 
Citizens should be enticed rather than bludgeoned into the formal sector.  The most 
effective approach may be to provide low-cost, user-friendly products that require 
minimal administration from clients and that utilise existing identification systems.  
Coercive financial regulation risks having the perverse effect of forcing people into the 
informal, unregulated system.  The disappearance of transactions into the informal 
sector without formal records or paper trails undermines the key object of AML and CFT 
regulation, i.e. more efficient law enforcement against money launders and potential 
terrorists. 
8.4. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IDENTIFICATION DIFFERENCES  
International client identification and verification standards must ensure that financial 
institutions are able to identify their clients. However, the information that is required to 
do so differs from country to country.  The example of South Africa is again instructive.  
South Africa has a national identification system and its citizens are issued with national 
identification numbers and identification books. At the beginning of 2004 28.5 million 
South Africans over the age of 18 years had national identification documents.21 This 
covers virtually the entire adult population.  The system links the ID number to the citizen 
and to information such as fingerprints and the citizen’s address at the time of 
                                                     
21  According to figures supplied by the Department of Home Affairs. 
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application.  The first six digits of the identity number reflect the person’s date of birth.  In 
a country without such a system, information relating to a person’s permanent residential 
address, date of birth, place of birth, occupation etc may be vital elements of a 
procedure to identify that person.  This information is not as crucial from a South African 
perspective where a person’s identity is comprehensively expressed in his or her identity 
number. 
In view of the importance and prevalence of the identity number in South Africa, and the 
relative unimportance of a formal residential address for many citizens, South Africa 
might be best served with a less complicated client identification and verification system.  
The system could focus on a person’s name, identity number and, where applicable, 
income tax number.  This information could be verified as currently required. The system 
could dispense with the requirements relating to the residential address. In the majority 
of cases businesses could ask this information as a matter of course to maintain contact 
with the client. However, financial institutions would not be burdened with the task of 
verifying residential addresses before they can open an account or conclude a 
transaction. This approach, albeit more relaxed, will still be effective and would satisfy 
the AML objectives of ensuring identification of the client.  
 
9. CONCLUSION 
This case study clearly highlights the need for appropriate interpretation and 
enforcement of the FATF recommendations, and the potentially negative impacts on the 
large section of the population that is socially and financially vulnerable, and dependent 
on the informal sector.  
Developing and middle-income countries need to first have a clear understanding of the 
operation and the positive and negative effects of AML/CFT regulation and enforcement 
before designing appropriate regulation.  At the international level there also needs to be 
an explicit recognition that a standard global template for FATF enforcement does not 
allow for developing country realities.  The international community needs to allow 
countries a reasonable measure of leeway to design unique, context-sensitive, and risk-
based systems to meet the international objectives in an effective and reasonable 
manner. 
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APPENDIX A:  BASEL CDD 
REQUIREMENTS 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a paper entitled “Customer due 
diligence for banks” in October 2001. The aim of the paper was to provide a customer 
identification and so-called know-your customer (“KYC”) framework that may serve as a 
benchmark for banking supervisors to establish national practices and for banks to 
design their own KYC programmes.  
The guidance provided in the paper enjoys broad international support from banking 
regulators. Participants in the 2002 International Conference of Banking Supervisors in 
Cape Town in September 2002 recognised the paper as the agreed standard on CDD. 
The participants represented banking regulators from more than 120 countries.   
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE POLICY 
The Basel paper requires banks to develop clear customer acceptance policies and 
procedures, including a description of the types of customer that are likely to pose a 
higher than average risk to a bank. In preparing such policies, factors such as a 
customer’s background, country of origin, public or high profile position, linked accounts 
and business activities should be considered. These policies and procedures should be 
graduated to require more extensive due diligence for higher risk customers.  
The paper is sensitive to the needs of the financially or socially disadvantaged. It allows 
client acceptance policies that may require the most basic account-opening 
requirements for a working individual with a small account balance. The paper also 
stresses that “[i]t is important that the customer acceptance policy is not so restrictive 
that it results in a denial of access by the general public to banking services, especially 
for people who are financially or socially disadvantaged.”  
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CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION 
The paper lays down a number of general principles regarding client identification. The 
principles include the following: 
 Banks should establish a systematic procedure for identifying new customers and 
should not establish a banking relationship until the identity of a new customer is 
satisfactorily verified;    
 The best documents for verifying the identity of customers are those most difficult to 
obtain illicitly and to counterfeit.  
 The customer identification process applies naturally at the outset of the relationship.   
 To ensure that records remain up-to-date and relevant, there is a need for banks to 
undertake regular reviews of existing records.  
 Banks need to obtain all information necessary to establish to their full satisfaction 
the identity of each new customer and the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship. The extent and nature of the information depends on the type 
of applicant (personal, corporate, etc.) and the expected size of the account.  
The paper was not specific on general identification requirements as the Working Group 
on Cross-Border Banking intended to develop guidelines on essential elements of 
customer identification requirements. These guidelines were published in February 2003 
as an attachment to the paper. The attachment is entitled “General guide to account 
opening and customer identification”.  
The guide deals with the identification requirements in respect of a host of customers. In 
respect of natural persons it requires the following information to be obtained, where 
applicable:   
 legal name and any other names used (such as maiden name);  
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 correct permanent address (the full address should be obtained; a Post Office box 
number is not sufficient);  
 telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address;  
 date and place of birth;  
 nationality;  
 occupation, public position held and/or name of employer;  
 an official personal identification number or other unique identifier contained in an 
unexpired official document (e.g. passport, identification card, residence permit, 
social security records, driving licence) that bears a photograph of the customer;  
 type of account and nature of the banking relationship; and 
 signature.  
The guide requires banks to verify this information by at least one of the following 
methods:   
 confirming the date of birth by comparing it to an official document such as a birth 
certificate, passport or identity document;  
 confirming the permanent address by comparing it to a document such as a utility 
bill, tax assessment, bank statement or a letter from a public authority;  
 contacting the customer by telephone, by letter or by e-mail to confirm the 
information supplied after an account has been opened (e.g. a disconnected phone, 
returned mail, or incorrect e-mail address should warrant further investigation);  
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 confirming the validity of the official documentation provided through certification by 
an authorised person (e.g. embassy official). 
The guide also formulated the following principles that are relevant to this study: 
 The examples of verification documents quoted in the guide are not the only 
possibilities. In particular jurisdictions there may be other documents of an 
equivalent nature which may be produced as satisfactory evidence of customers' 
identity.   
 Financial institutions should apply equally effective customer identification 
procedures for non-face-to-face customers as for those available for interview.   
 For one-off or occasional transactions where the amount of the transaction or series 
of linked transactions does not exceed an established minimum monetary value, it 
might be sufficient to require and record only the name and address of the customer.  
It is important to note from the perspective of this study that the guide produced in 
February 2003 is as concerned with the protection of the financially and socially 
vulnerable as the main paper was in October 2001. Paragraph 16 provides the following 
guidance: 
“It is important that the customer acceptance policy is not so restrictive that it results in a 
denial of access by the general public to banking services, especially for people who are 
financially or socially disadvantaged.”  
The Basel principles and guidelines in this regard were formulated before 2003 FATF 
Forty Recommendations were finalised. They influenced the drafting of the 
Recommendations, but unfortunately the Recommendations did not follow their lead by 
expressly providing safeguards for the interests of the financially and socially vulnerable. 
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APPENDIX B:  SOUTH AFRICAN CLIENT 
IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
From the perspective of low income banking, the statutory identification and verification 
requirements relating to natural South African citizens and residents are of importance. 
These requirements are set out in Regulations 3 and 4 of the Money Laundering Control 
Regulations.  
BASIC IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
In short, the scheme requires the following information to be obtained in respect of a 
customer who is a South African citizen or resident and who does not require legal 
assistance and is not providing assistance to another: 
 Full names 
 Date of birth 
 Identity number 
 Income tax number if issued to the client (accountable institutions are currently 
exempted from this duty) 
 Residential address. 
The information must be verified in the following way: 
 The full names, date of birth and identity number must be compared with: 
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 an identification document of the person (defined in relation to a South African 
citizen or resident as an official identity document);  or 
 if the person is, for a reason which is acceptable to the bank, unable to produce a 
identity document, another document which is acceptable to the bank (taking into 
regard any guidance notes that may be applicable) and which  bears: 
 a photograph of the person; 
 the person’s full names or initials and surname; 
 the person’s date of birth; and 
 the person’s identity number. 
 If it is believed to be necessary, taking into account any relevant guidance notes, 
any of these particulars must be compared with information which is obtained from 
any other independent source. 
 The income tax number must be compared to a document issued by SARS bearing 
such a number and the name of the person. 
 The residential address must be compared to information that can reasonably be 
expected to achieve verification of the particulars and can be obtained by reasonably 
practical means (taking into regard any relevant guidance notes). 
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH RISK CUSTOMERS AND 
TRANSACTIONS 
Regulation 21 compels the bank to obtain further information concerning a business 
relationship or single transaction which poses a particularly high risk of facilitating money 
laundering activities or to enable the accountable institution to identify the proceeds of 
unlawful activity or money laundering activities. The information which the bank must 
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obtain in these circumstances must be adequate to reasonably enable the institution to 
determine whether the relevant transactions are consistent with the bank’s knowledge of 
that client and that client’s business activities and must include particulars concerning 
the source of that client’s income; and the source of the funds which that client expects 
to use in concluding the single transaction or transactions in the course of the business 
relationship. 
EXISTING CLIENTS 
These requirements came into effect on 30 June 2003 in respect of new customers. 
FICA gave accountable institutions until 30 June 2004 to identify their existing clients 
and to verify their particulars in accordance with FICA.  After 30 June 2004 they are not 
allowed to do business with such clients before they have been identified and verified. 
UPDATING OF INFORMATION 
Regulation 19 compels an accountable institution to take reasonable steps in respect of 
an existing business relationship, to maintain the correctness of particulars which are 
susceptible to change and are obtained as part of the identification and verification 
procedures 
EXEMPTIONS 
The Minister of Finance published a number of exemptions from the money laundering 
control obligations when the regulations were published. These exemptions relate mainly 
to low risk customers and transactions, for instance specific insurance products with 
annual premiums below US$ 3000 per year, verification of details of clients in FATF-
compliant jurisdictions, companies listed on recognised exchanges etc. The set of 
exemptions also includes an exemption in respect of mass banking clients (clients 
whose bank balance do not exceed US$ 3800, whose rights to deposit and withdraw 
funds are limited to specified amounts and who are not entitled to transfer funds out of 
their accounts internationally.) Unfortunately the mass banking exemption is unworkable 
in practice and the whole scheme of exemption has come under fire. In its June 2003 
FATF evaluation South Africa was criticised for its “large number of exemptions from the 
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customer identification and record-keeping requirement, some of which seem to unduly 
limit the effectiveness of the law.” FATF therefore found that these exemptions should be 
amended or their number lessened. 
